




St. Petersburg State University 
Graduate School of Management 







OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CROSS-BORDER M&A PERFORMANCE: THE 






Master’s Thesis by the 2nd year student  
Concentration — MIM 
Huang Junjie 
 
Research advisor:  
Associate Professor, 














ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ О САМОСТОЯТЕЛЬНОМ ХАРАКТЕРЕ ВЫПОЛНЕНИЯ 
ВЫПУСКНОЙ КВАЛИФИКАЦИОННОЙ РАБОТЫ 
Я, Хуан Цзюньцзе, студент второго курса магистратуры направления 
«Менеджмент», заявляю, что в моей магистерской диссертации на тему  
«Структура собственности и результативность международных сделок по 
слияниям и поглощениям: исследование компаний Китая»,  
представленной в службу обеспечения программ магистратуры для последующей 
передачи в государственную аттестационную комиссию для публичной защиты, не 
содержится элементов плагиата.  
Все прямые заимствования из печатных и электронных источников, а также из 
защищенных ранее выпускных квалификационных работ, кандидатских и докторских 
диссертаций имеют соответствующие ссылки. 
Мне известно содержание п. 9.7.1 Правил обучения по основным образовательным 
программам высшего и среднего профессионального образования в СПбГУ о том, что 
«ВКР выполняется индивидуально каждым студентом под руководством назначенного 
ему научного руководителя», и п. 51 Устава федерального государственного 
бюджетного образовательного учреждения высшего образования «Санкт-
Петербургский государственный университет»  о том, что «студент подлежит 
отчислению из Санкт-Петербургского университета за представление курсовой или 
выпускной квалификационной работы, выполненной другим лицом (лицами)». 












STATEMENT ABOUT THE INDEPENDENT CHARACTER OF  
THE MASTER THESIS 
I, Huang Junjie, second year master student, program «Management», state that my 
master thesis on the topic  
“Ownership structure and cross-border M&A performance: the study of Chinese 
companies”,  
which is presented to the Master Office to be submitted to the Official Defense 
Committee for the public defense, does not contain any elements of plagiarism.  
All direct borrowings from printed and electronic sources, as well as from master theses, 
PhD and doctorate theses which were defended earlier, have appropriate references.  
I am aware that according to paragraph 9.7.1. of  Guidelines for instruction in major 
curriculum programs of higher and secondary professional education at St.Petersburg 
University «A master thesis must be completed by each of the degree candidates individually 
under the supervision of his or her advisor», and according to paragraph 51 of Charter of the 
Federal State Institution of Higher Education Saint-Petersburg State University «a student can 
be expelled from St.Petersburg University for submitting of the course or graduation 
qualification work developed by other person (persons)». 
















Table of Contents 
1. Introduction 5 
2. Theoretical background 8 
2.1 Research background 8 
2.2 Innovation point 10 
2.3 M&A performance and its evaluation method 11 
2.3.1 M&A performance 11 
2.3.2 Evaluation methods 12 
2.4 Ownership structure 14 
2.4.1 Analysis of former research on ownership structure 15 
2.4.2 Agency theory and stakeholder theory 17 
3. Empirical study I 21 
3.1 Sample selection 21 
3.2 Financial ratios selection 23 
3.3 Factor analysis and cross-border M&A performance 26 
3.4 The result of factor analysis on the cross-border M&A performance 34 
3.4.1 The comprehensive performance scores of all samples 34 
3.4.2 The comparison between SOEs and POEs regarding the cross-border performance 35 
3.5 Analysis of the result 36 
4. Empirical study II 37 
4.1 Variable description and model design 37 
4.2 Multicollinearity test 42 
4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 42 
4.4 Robustness test 45 
4.5 Result analysis 48 
4.6 Managerial and policy implications 51 
5. Conclusion 53 
References 55 
Appendix 61 






The global trade has gone more profound, and the international economic institution has 
primarily improved in the period of a digital revolution since technologies have experienced a 
rather rapid development. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Mergers & Acquisitions, 
M&A) have already become a popular and valuable model for enterprises to penetrate foreign 
markets nowadays. With regards to keeping the sustainable competitive position, which is 
considered as the main target for modern companies, M&A is the one of the most important 
strategies for companies to realise this aim (González-Torres, et al., 2020). After the new 
millennium with the rapid development of Chinese economy, cross-border M&A transactions 
conducted by Chinese companies have surged to a huge number and caught the world’s 
attention. 
 
The cross-border M&A performance of a company is impacted by different internal and 
external factors. The topic of the impact of the factors on cross-border M&A performance is 
still fresh and studied by the academics worldwide. Especially, the impact of corporate 
governance on cross-border M&A performance in the Chinese context is one of the most 
popular research topics for the corporate study.  
 
Therefore, the goal of the study in this paper is to investigate the impact of ownership 
structure on cross-border M&A performance of Chinese companies. Then, this paper focuses 
on the research about the impact of the degree of restriction on the controlling right/power of 
the largest shareholder by the other large shareholders, the degree of ownership concentration, 
the executive ownership, and the equity nature of the companies on cross-border M&A 
performance of Chinese companies from the perspective of corporate governance. Based on 
the four variables mentioned earlier, this paper will conduct an empirical analysis and hopes to 
acquire detailed results about to what extent the cross-border M&A performance is impacted 
by these four variables and the inner governance mechanism. 
 
The methodology of this paper is to collect and analyse the literature on cross-border M&A 
performance, the literature on the ownership of the largest shareholder and cross-border M&A 
performance, on the ownership concentration and cross-border M&A performance, on the 
executive ownership and cross-border M&A performance, and on the equity nature (status of 
SOE and POE of Chinese companies) and cross-border M&A performance. The paper 
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summarised the basic theories in this section and then derived five hypotheses according to the 
theoretical analysis in the later section. 
 
Based on the literature reviews, the data models are to be established and the empirical test 
is used for testing the 5 hypotheses. This paper establishes the cross-border M&A performance 
model by applying the factor analysis on the selected financial ratios from China Stock Market 
& Accounting Research database (CSMAR), then to design the empirical model and test the 
relationships between the ratio of the sum of shareholdings of the 2nd and 3rd large shareholders 
to the shareholding of the largest shareholder and cross-border M&A performance, between 
ownership concentration and cross-border M&A performance, between executive ownership 
(rate of executive shares) and cross-border M&A performance, and between equity nature 
(status of SOE and POE) and cross-border M&A performance. According to the result of the 
empirical analysis, the paper gives the insights and provides effective and reasonable 
suggestions for both Chinese companies and government. 
 
In this paper, the research on the key factors impacting the cross-border M&A performance 
of Chinese companies is aiming to provide the theoretical foundation and the empirical practice 
for future research. Firstly, both Chinese and foreign researchers have studied and analysed 
cross-border performance from different perspectives and through different theoretical bases. 
The influence upon the countries where the underlying sides in the cross-border M&A 
transactions are located, the motives for cross-border M&A, and the cross-border M&A 
performance are the three hot topics for the research in the M&A sector. The research on the 
influence upon the countries where the underlying sides in the cross-border M&A activities are 
located, and the motives for cross-border M&A have been very mature and achieved fruitful 
results. As for the M&A performance, it is a topic that is still relatively fresh in comparison to 
other two topics and worthy of being explored deeper. Therefore, this paper starts the research 
on the cross-border M&A of Chinese companies from the general perspective of ownership 
structure and then explicitly and deeply discuss it in more specific and detailed sectors. 
Secondly, the paper hopes to achieve practical results, which could benefit the Chinese 
companies preparing for the cross-border M&A and support them make scientific and 
reasonable decisions from the perspective of corporate governance. From the broad sense, the 
paper hopes that the practical foundation and empirical practice would provide a valuable and 
efficient guide for the Chinese government while conducting the more profound reform upon 
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the system of corporate ownership structure for enhancing the development of market economy 
at the new stage. 
 
The paper has the following structure: 
First chapter, introduction. In this section, the paper has introduced the research background 
and the research goal, and then introduced the basic research methodology and the basic 
research thinking. 
 
Second chapter, theoretical background. In this section, the paper elaborated the research 
background and pointed out the possible creativity of the study in this paper. Then, the paper 
analysed the former studies and has summarised the conclusions of the predecessors and 
clarified the concepts and theories about cross-border M&A, the evaluation methods on cross-
border M&A performance, and ownership structure in this part. Based on the opinions, 
analyses and conclusions from the former studies, the paper proposed five hypotheses. 
 
Third chapter, evaluation model design and the analysis on cross-border M&A performance. 
The paper designed a comprehensive evaluation system on cross-border M&A performance 
and then has conducted factor analysis. Then, the paper calculated the comprehensive 
performance scores of cross-border M&As and has analysed the figures based on the model. 
 
Fourth chapter, empirical testing and the analysis on the impact of ownership structure to 
cross-border M&A performance. In this section, the paper conducted the regression analysis 
based on the selected variables and analysed the result. Then, to give the managerial and policy 
implications based on the analysis of the empirical result. 
 
Fifth chapter, conclusion. In the final section, the paper has drawn a conclusion covering 








2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1 Research background 
 
Over the last few decades, most of the growth in outbound investment is achieved by cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The implementation of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) is always considered as one of the most critical strategic decisions for 
companies to enhance the corporate competitive advantages, expand the overseas markets, 
achieve growth, and gain the market shares, protect the resources, acquire the strategic 
resources, or improve the corporate efficiency in the rather competitive business environment 
nowadays. Adopting cross-border mergers and acquisitions is also one of the most meaningful 
ways to protect companies and enhance corporate capabilities in a rapidly changing business 
environment.  
 
Zhou, et al. (2016) have pointed out in their paper that the rapid growth of emerging markets 
has not only made them become the main and hot places for global expansion of the major 
Introduction
Theoretical background
Design and empirical analysis on cross-border M&A 
performance





developed economies, but more and more companies from emerging economies are also 
expanding their overseas business. Since the 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) from 
emerging economies has surged to an extremely high level and has become a rather important 
impetus for global economic growth (Yang & Deng, 2015). In the past decade, the global 
expansion of emerging economies has almost caught up with the pace at which advanced 
economies entered the emerging markets. According to the Handbook of Statistics 2020 issued 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China can still be 
considered as the largest attracting foreign investment country among the emerging economies. 
Based on the Chinese M&A market report 2020 from Daxue Consulting, Chinese outbound 
M&A activities have experienced a quick increase until 2016. Although the numbers and 
values of M&A have slumped after the U.S. President Donald Trump came into power, they 
remained at a high level, which has well reflected the vitality of Chinese companies in the 
outbound M&A market in the context of “Trade War” between China and the U.S. Therefore, 
the cross-border M&A of Chinese enterprises continue to attract the attention of the scholars 
and academia.  
 
 
Figure 1, M&A from China to abroad (Outbound) (Including Hongkong) 
 
There is no doubt that the enthusiasm of Chinese enterprises to participate in M&A 
activities is relatively high, but the completion rate of cross-border M&A is only 67%, which 
is much lower than that of developed countries (Willers et al., 2015). In terms of generating 
profit, most M&A companies have negative post-merger gains. Some scholars have already 
clearly pointed out that about 50% of successful transactions have not realised gains, and this 
rate may reach 70 to 90% (Breuer, Ahmad, & Salzmann, 2018). Therefore, the topic of M&A 
performance of Chinese enterprises is already really concerned by many Chinese researchers. 
Liu, et al. (2017) studied the impact of political connections on M&A performance in Chinese 
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market by Chinese listed firms. They found out that political connections have a negative effect 
on value in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but have a positive effect on value in private-owned 
enterprises (POEs). Gao, et al. (2019) have investigated the relationship between political 
connections and M&A performance in Chinese market from the perspective of Chinese family 
firms. They found out that family firms are more likely to have higher domestic M&A 
performance if they have political connections. Ma, et al. (2016) investigated how state 
ownership affects the post-M&A performance of Chinese firms in the Chinese domestic market. 
They have found that Chinese SOEs have larger long-term performance improvement after the 
M&A deals in comparison to the Chinese POEs. In order to study Chinese M&A topic further 
and not be confined to the Chinese domestic market, this paper will focus on the cross-border 
M&A transactions launched by Chinese companies.  
 
As a fundamental and essential aspect of corporate operations, corporate governance is one 
of the main factors having the impact on M&A performance. The level of governance structure 
directly influences whether the company can make scientific and reasonable M&A decisions. 
As an essential part of the corporate governance field, the ownership structure determines the 
company's governance behaviour, influences the company's governance efficiency, and further 
impacts the company's business activities and performance. Since most Chinese listed 
companies originate from the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), Chinese SOEs 
still have a strong influence in the Chinese capital market. The high degree of ownership 
concentration was a typical feature of Chinese SOE’s ownership structure before Chinese 
corporate reform. The state-owned shares and the ownership concentration still deeply 
influence the Chinese companies (both SOEs and POEs) in the Chinese capital market. 
Additionally, the feature of high ownership concentration directly affects the company's ability 
to make scientific and reasonable M&A decisions, and it is also highly related to the M&A 
performance of Chinese listed companies. Therefore, studying the impact of ownership 
structure on the M&A is of great significance for the deep and comprehensive understanding 
of cross-border M&A transactions of Chinese listed companies. This paper will discuss the 
impact of ownership structure on cross-border M&A performance of Chinese companies from 
the perspective of corporate governance. 
 




In the former studies about the impact of ownership structure on M&A performance, 
companies or acquirers from the developed markets are the first target for researchers. Song, 
Zheng and Zhou (2021) has analysed the impacts of opaqueness and the level of information 
asymmetry to M&A performance in the developed market. Moeini, Nair, and Chen (2020) 
found out that US companies have better M&A performance in terms of capital market reaction 
while they have the superior digital readiness to target companies. Since the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) started and has a huge development, the Chinese government provides more 
policy supports for cross-border trade and commerce (Du, 2021). Therefore, more and more 
scholars begin to study the M&A topic from the perspectives of Chinese companies in terms 
of the developing market. But a lot of Chinese researchers only systematically researched on 
this topic in terms of Chinese domestic market. Although there are some Chinese and western 
researchers studied the M&A topic and analysed the impacts on the cross-border performance 
of Chinese companies, they mainly focused on the impacts caused by the industry difference, 
motives for cross-border M&A transactions, political connection, and so on. Very few 
researchers studied the impact from the ownership structure and evaluated the cross-border 
M&A performance either through the event study method, or through the single indicator 
evaluation method and by selecting the samples which performed cross-border M&As in a 
certain year (for example, all M&A samples in 2014). So, their studies either analysed the 
short-term cross-border M&A performance of Chinese companies or didn’t comprehensively 
analysed the cross-border M&A performance of Chinese companies. Their results of the 
impacts on M&A performance don’t well reflect the comprehensive situation of the cross-
border M&A performance of Chinese companies. Hence, this paper analyses the impacts from 
the ownership structure perspective using a more comprehensive method from the perspective 
of Chinese acquirers. The next section is to elaborate the different approaches for measuring 
the M&A performance and justify the innovation point of this paper. 
 
2.3 M&A performance and its evaluation method 
 
2.3.1 M&A performance 
 
M&A performance is about the benefits to companies brought about by the companies’ 
mergers and acquisitions activities. The companies’ cross-border M&A performance can be 




From the macro-perspective, cross-border M&A activities can help a company with 
technological innovation, finance cost reduction, and enhance its capability against the risks. 
Furthermore, cross-border M&A activities can bring benefits to the national macro-economy, 
such as promoting the domestic industrial structure upgrade and optimising the resources 
allocation worldwide. 
 
From the micro-perspective, M&A activities can bring changes to both the company and 
shareholders. Therefore, the analysis of the cross-border M&A performance mainly focuses on 
the company and shareholders. The main groups of the stakeholders influenced by the changed 
from the M&A activities are company owners, executives, and creditors. The changes in the 
companies are including operating efficiency, asset structure, financial structure, etc. 
 
In this paper, cross-border M&A performance of the companies is analysed from the micro-
perspectives, focusing on Chinese SOEs and POEs.  
 
2.3.2 Evaluation methods 
 
The first method is the accounting-based measures. The accounting-based measures is to 
test M&A performance by analysing financial indicators before and after M&A activities. The 
accounting-based measures can be subdivided into the single indicator evaluation approach and 
the comprehensive evaluation approach. The selection of the approach depends on the number 
of the selected financial indicators.  
 
The single indicator evaluation approach uses only one indicator to measure the company’s 
financial performance. The financial ratios, such as “Return on Assets” (ROA), “Earnings per 
Share” (EPS), etc., are the most used indicators. Li, Wang, et al. (2020) has selected ROA as 
the indicator in their research and has pointed out the effects of institutional on companies’ 
cross-border M&A performance in the short term and in the long term. Jin, Xu, et al. (2020) 
has applied ROA as the only indicator of company’s M&A performance in the research and 
examined that the venture capital institutions have strong positive effects on listed companies’ 
M&A performance if the institutions have the strong information resource acquisition ability 
or high participate in the M&A process. Prasadh, Thenmozhi, and Hu (2020) have used ROA 
in their paper as the sole indicator reflecting the performance of cross-border acquisitions and 
they found out that the long-term post-acquisition performance is affected by the economic 
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freedom distance. In general, the most advantage of this method is simple calculation. But only 
one indicator can’t reflect the comprehensive performance of a company.  
 
The comprehensive evaluation approach is to select some financial data from the financial 
statements and then to organize them as indicators for the financial performance study. By 
conducting the factor analysis (SPSS used in this paper), these indicators are converted into the 
comprehensive scores which can well reflect the entire M&A performance of the companies. 
Professor Fukuda Akira (2020) has applied several financial ratios in his paper for the 
performance post M&A deals in Japan and they are ROA, ROE, operating CF total assets ratio, 
free CF assets ratio, equity total assets ratio, Tobin’s q, stock price volatility, etc. In another 
paper, Hanelt, et al. (2020) has used market-to-book ratio (Unotila et al., 2009; etc.), return on 
assets (He & Huang, 2011; etc.), and earnings per share (EPS) as the indicators to measure 
different types of performance. They pointed out that digital innovation has positive effects on 
firm’s performance. Kar, et al. (2020) has analysed the role of M&As on corporate performance 
from the perspective of Indian IT companies by applying four performance indicators, 
normalised EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization), 
ROCE (Return on Capital Employed), RONW (Return on Net Worth), and normalised revenue. 
Yang and Ai (2021) measured the profitability of Chinese high-tech companies post-M&A 
deals based on ROA (Return on Assets) and ROS (Return on Sales). In general, the 
comprehensive evaluation approach takes different factors into consideration while measuring 
the company’s financial performance. Therefore, this approach can more concretely reflect the 
company’s cross-border M&A performance in comparison to the single indicator evaluation 
approach. 
 
The second method is the event study. The event study method is an empirical study method 
that studies the impact of the occurrence of some events on the selected variables. This method 
is very popular in analysing the M&A performance. Xiao, Yang, and Li (2020) have analysed 
the short-term M&A performance of Chinese firms by the evidence from 2006 to 2019 based 
on the event study. Liu, Luo, and Tian (2017) studied the impacts from political connections 
on the M&A performance of Chinese companies by the evidence from 2005 to 2011 based on 
the CARs of the event study. Gao, Huang, and Yang (2019) examined the M&A performance 
in Chinese domestic market from the perspective of Chinese family firms based on the event 
study. In the research of M&A performance, the event is the announcement of a M&A activity. 
The variables to be analysed are the average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal 
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return. The procedure is that an event window is determined for the research at first.  There is 
no unified standard for the length of the event window. The event window applied by most 
studies is (-20,20). The longer the period is, the more it can reflect the impact on the M&A 
performance, but other variables may also have the influence on the M&A performance and 
the analysis result may not accurate due to the unknown interference factors. Then, the daily 
expected returns of each company are to be calculated based on three methods, market model 
(MM), market adjusted model (MMA), and the constant mean return model (COMEAN) 
(MacKinlay 1997; Kaspereit 2020). If a company didn’t have an M&A event during this period, 
then the returns that the company had at this time is the expected returns. After this, by 
calculating the difference between the company's daily actual return and the expected return, 
the result of the difference is the abnormal return of the company. Then, calculate the average 
of the abnormal returns of all sample companies in all event windows. At last, calculate the 
cumulated average abnormal return (CAR), if CAP is larger than 0, then it means that the M&A 
event has brought abnormal returns to companies, if CAP is smaller than 0, then it means that 
companies has suffered the loss. 
 
The premise of using the event study method is the effectiveness of the capital market. In 
China, the stock market is still rather immature, and stock price of a company may fluctuate 
drastically due to the various external factors (such as secret deal, black case work, etc.). 
Therefore, during the M&A announcement period, the change in stock prices can not accurately 
reflect the impact from the M&A event. Additionally, the short length of the event window 
only provides a short term-data. The short-term data can’t comprehensively reflect the 
company’s M&A performance because company’s M&A performance needs the integration of 
multiple indicators to be reflected after M&A in a long period. 
 
In order to avoid inaccuracy in M&A performance measurement by solely studying the 
company value changes in the Chinese stock market, which is not sound and immature, and to 
analyse the M&A performance in a comprehensive way with less interference factors, the paper 
is applying the comprehensive evaluation approach to measure Chinese companies’ cross-
border M&A performance. 
 




2.4.1 Analysis of former research on ownership structure 
 
Ownership structure is an important component of the corporate governance mechanism, 
and its core content includes the ownership concentration, the equity nature, and the 
shareholding of executives, etc. In 1990, McConnell and Servaes successfully tested the 
hypothesis that corporate value is a function of the structure of equity ownership by 
investigating the relationship between ownership structure and Tobin’s Q (market value of a 
company/ assets' replacement cost). Their study has made the quantitative research on the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate value. Therefore, their paper provides 
an evidence for the paper to apply a quantitative method in the empirical study to analyse the 
impact of ownership structure on cross-border M&A performance of Chinese companies.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) have discussed the relationship between the ownership 
concentration and corporate performance. They think that the small shareholders are less likely 
to supervise the management because of the high cost of supervision in comparison to the low 
benefits the group of small shareholders could receive. But the large shareholders, considering 
the large interests brought to them according to their ownership, are more willing to supervise 
the management, and will strictly examine the M&A activities launched by the management. 
Then only M&A deals which are favourable to the company will be accepted in the company. 
In another word, based on their opinion, the high ownership concentration which brings about 
the strict supervision will be beneficiary to the corporate performance. Under this circumstance, 
the large shareholders are the positive factors to the corporate governance. Some other 
researchers have developed the study about the role of the large shareholders in terms of 
ownership concentration from different perspectives. Andres (2008) has found out in his study 
that the performance of family businesses is better in the companies where the founding family 
is still active either on the executive or the supervisory board as a large shareholder, other large 
shareholders either adversely affect the performance of the firm or have no conspicuous 
influence on company’s performance. But he also mentioned that if the families are not 
involved in the supervisory board, but only perform as the large shareholders, then the 
company’s will be as normal as the most companies. Therefore, based on his research from the 
perspective of family business, the supervision from the large shareholders plays an important 
role in the company’s performance. When the large shareholders are involved in the 
supervisory tasks of the company, the negative factors in the management can be effectively 
restrained and favourable decisions which would bring benefits to the company can be made 
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by the management group. Different from the results of the studies of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) and Andres (2008), La Porta, Lopez, et al. (2000) think the main problem in the 
corporate governance is that the large shareholders encroach upon the interests of small and 
medium shareholders in the most companies in the world. The highly concentrated ownership 
structure provides the convenient conditions for large shareholders to seize personal interests 
during the process of M&A. Therefore, based on their thoughts, only the controlling 
right/power of the largest shareholder is restricted and the balance of controlling right/power 
based on the stakeholders’ ownership in the company is formed, can the small and medium 
shareholders efficiently supervise the behaviours of the large shareholders. Then the best effect 
of corporate governance will be achieved. In this case, the largest shareholder is considered as 
the negative internal factor to the corporate governance and the negative effect from the largest 
shareholder can be mitigated by the other large shareholders to some extent. Apart from the 
internal factors having the influence on the corporate governance, some external factors play 
the effective role in corporate governance. Nguyen, et al. (2015) have investigated the 
relationship between ownership concentration and companies’ financial performance from the 
perspective of national governance quality. By comparing the performance between the 
companies from Singapore and Vietnam, they have argued that ownership concentration can 
be considered as an efficient corporate governance mechanism and substitute for weak national 
governance quality which is very common in the emerging markets. Thus, based on their study, 
ownership concentration can be used as an effective strategy for emerging countries to avoid 
the negative effects to the companies’ performance due to the weak national governance quality. 
Then, the corporate governance works in different ways according to the quality of national 
governance under a specific economic and social system in a country. In addition to the external 
factor from the nation level, the executives, as the external personnel hired by companies for 
better management, are the one of the most important factors in the corporate governance.  
Boateng and Huang (2016) have discussed the fact that agency problems are created by the 
concentrated ownership, and they have made a favourable argument in their paper that the 
presence of multiple large shareholders is an important and efficient internal governance 
mechanism. This sort of corporate governance mechanism can effectively mitigate the agency 
costs of a firm. Hence, according to their study, the key of solution to the agency problems is 
to have multiple large shareholders in the company, playing their roles in preventing the 
excessive concentration of ownership and balancing the power of the shareholders with 
excessive control rights. Therefore, the agency problem caused by the executives in the 
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companies’ management is inevitable for the corporate governance. The next section is going 
to go deep into the related theories or concepts. 
 
2.4.2 Agency theory and stakeholder theory 
 
(1) Agency theory 
 
The principal-agent relationship is a common phenomenon in modern companies. The 
separation of ownership and control has led to the phenomenon of a principal-agent relationship 
between shareholders (the principal(s)) and operators (the agent(s)). It is that shareholders have 
little or even no direct control over management decisions (Marks, 1999). In the 1930s, 
American scholars Berle and Means (1933) found that the practice of business owners 
operating and managing the business did not bring significant benefits to the business. It is that 
the dual identity of shareholders as owners and management is not conducive to the long-term 
development of the business. However, if the company hires the external professional 
managers to manage the company while retaining the right of residual claim, the situation of 
poor management and operation caused by the combination of ownership and control can be 
well improved. On this basis, Berle and Means (1933) put forward the “Agency Theory”, 
proposed the separation of ownership and control, and advocated enterprises to convey the 
control to professionals. Later on, researchers, such as Eisenhardt (1989), Panda and Leepsa 
(2017), have discussed the agency theory from the theoretical aspects and empirical evidence 
based on the former research. 
 
In actual business operations, there is an information asymmetry (information is asymmetry 
in time or in content) between the agent and the principal. Agents can possess more 
comprehensive information in their daily operations, while the vast majority of small and 
medium shareholders are absolutely in a weak position for obtaining information. Therefore, 
this could lead to the consequence that principal can’t supervise the agent in place. Meanwhile, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) have defined the concept of “agency costs” from the aspect of 
ownership structure of the firm and they pointed out that there are some divergences between 
the principal and the agent while the ownership and control are separated. The divergence in 
the interests for the principal(s) and agent(s) may further lead to the consequence that the agent 





Under this circumstance, whether the company can effectively reduce the losses possibly 
caused by the operators (the agent(s)) largely depends on the supervision and execution ability 
of the shareholders (the principal(s)) over the operators (the agent(s)). The power of 
supervision and execution relies on the ownership of shareholders to a large extent. If the 
shareholders totally give up the supervision over the operators based on the right provided by 
their ownership, then the supervision over the operators will not be executed and the agency 
problem will get worse. On the contrary, if shareholders excessively use the power of 
supervision conferred by ownership, it will be easily to lead to the consequence of the 
interference with the decision-making of the operator in the business, then causing the 
reduction of the operator's work efficiency, and ultimately the company’s losses. In a word, a 
company must deal with the issue of ownership structure, reasonably arrange the shareholding 
ratio of each shareholder, and keep shareholders' ownership in an appropriate degree, thereby 
mitigating the agency problem. 
 
(2) Stakeholder Theory 
 
In 1984, R. E. Freeman introduced the stakeholder theory at the first time in the book 
Strategic Management: a Stakeholder Approach. He thinks that organisations have 
stakeholders who are groups and individuals that can influence the realisation of the 
organisation’s missions and goals or are affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
missions and goals (Freeman, 1984).  
 
The core idea of stakeholder theory is that whether an organization can be successful or not 
is much relying on to what extent it can manage the relationships with key stakeholders that 
can affect the achievement of its purpose. The stakeholders of an enterprise mainly include 
ownership stakeholders (such as shareholders), groups with certain social interests in the 
company (such as government), etc. Because of the interests-driven reason, stakeholders will 
actively participate in corporate governance. Therefore, their behaviour will affect the business 
decision-making of the company. But the strengths of the various stakeholders of an enterprise 
are different, which leads to differences in their influence on corporate governance. 
 
Freeman and Phillips (2002) have also pointed out that the manager’s job is to keep the 
support from all the stakeholder groups, balancing their interests, while making sure that 
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stakeholder interests can be maximised over time in the organisation. At the same time, 
stakeholder theory can better help managers clearly describe and promote the shared purpose 
of the firm (Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004). But maximising the interests doesn’t mean that 
all stakeholders will benefit all the time, most corporate strategies will distribute both benefits 
and harms between different groups of stakeholders (Freeman & McVea, 2001). Normally, if 
the largest shareholder holds the majority shares in a company, the problem of over 
concentration in the ownership structure will possibly turn up. The consequence is that the cost 
of supervision by small shareholders over the large shareholders becomes much higher. The 
power in ownership structure will be unbalanced and quickly tip to the side of the largest 
shareholder. Then the largest shareholder may be more likely to maximise own interests by 
cooperation with the management and harming the interests of small and medium shareholders 
(Huang, Dong, et al., 2020). And the reasonable ownership structure can help to improve the 
level of company governance and may largely avoid the issue of interest conflict in the 
company. 
 
(3) Hypothesis formulation  
 
As it is mentioned at the beginning, this paper is aiming at study the impact of ownership 
structure on the cross-border M&A performance from the perspective of Chinese companies. 
Ownership structure, as the essential part of corporate governance, can be studied from the 
ownership concentration and equity structure respectively. The paper has reviewed the 
literature on the impact of ownership concentration and the largest shareholders on the 
company’s performance, and the paper have also discussed the agency theory and stakeholder 
theory. According to the agency theory and stakeholder theory, large shareholders have more 
control power in the company comparing the small shareholders. Because large shareholders 
have the large proportion of shares in the company, their benefits are consistent with the 
interests of the company. Hence, they are more active in the participation in the process of 
company management. However, the small shareholders are less likely to participate in the 
process of company management, especially supervision over the management, due to the 
imbalance between low benefits and high cost of participation, they are more willing to be the 
free riders (Bai & An, 2021). Therefore, there is not enough power balance over the large 
shareholders and then they may make the M&A decision by putting their influence in the board 
which may ultimately harm the benefits of the small shareholders. The imbalanced power due 
to the concentrated ownership in the company may lead to the consequence of the failure of 
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the corporate governance mechanism and then the comprehensive benefits of the company will 
be negatively affected (Dai & Li, 2021). Nevertheless, the cross-border M&As are highly 
related to the long-term interests of the company. Because of the concentrated ownership and 
the large shareholdings, the interests of the large shareholders are highly positively consistent 
with the interests of the company. Then the large shareholders will naturally consider the long-
term interests of the company as their own long-term interests. Therefore, they will put much 
more efforts in monitoring the management in order to improve the decision efficiency and 
temporarily ignore the encroachment upon the benefits from the small shareholders. 
Meanwhile, when there are multiple large shareholders with similar shareholdings in the 
company, the motive of mutual restraint and supervision of other large shareholders over the 
largest shareholders can help prevent the largest shareholders from seeking personal gains by 
encroaching other large shareholders interests (Wang, 2020). Then, two hypotheses are 
formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): ownership concentration is positively correlated with company’s cross-
border M&A performance.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): the degree of restriction on the largest shareholder’s controlling 
right/power is negatively correlated with company’s cross-border M&A performance.  
 
According to the agency theory, the separation of ownership and control in the modern 
company has created the agency problem. The agent hired by the company for the professional 
management usually have no shares in the company. So, the interests of the agent are not as 
the interests of the shareholders, closely consistent with the interests of the company, then the 
agent may make the M&A decisions which are divergent from the interests of the shareholders. 
Based on the stakeholder theory, the appropriate equity incentives can improve the agent 
decision efficiency. In another word, when the agent becomes a stakeholder of the company, 
the interests of the agent and the company will be connected, and the agent will perform better 
in the management and the M&A decisions in accordance with the interests of the company. 
Therefore, one hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): the degree of executive ownership is positively correlated with 




In China, Chinese SOEs play an important part in the Chinese capital market. But the 
problems of low efficiency, low earning capacity, etc, have made Chinese SOEs less and less 
suitable for the market economy system in China according to the study of Chinese researchers. 
Then Chinese government has paid high attention to this issue and launched the economic 
reform on Chinese SOEs since 1992 after the late Chinese president Deng Xiaoping finished 
the southern tour, and the restrictions on Chinese POEs are gradually lifted during the 
systematic economic reform. Especially in the field of cross-border M&As, Chinese 
government provides the crucial support to Chinese POEs. Regarding the cross-border M&As 
from 2014 to 2018, Chinese POEs have performed 629 cross-border M&A deals, but Chinese 
SOEs have conducted 230 cross-border M&A deals, only nearly one third of the numbers of 
the cross-border M&A deals performed by POEs. At the same time, the government 
background of Chinese SOEs has made them bear more policy burdens, and their cross-border 
M&A behaviours often reflect the will of the government. While pursuing economic benefits, 
they must also take social responsibility into account (Ren, Zhou, et al., 2021). Therefore, under 
this circumstance, it is highly possible that there is a big difference in cross-border M&A 
performance between Chinese SOEs and POEs. Then, to examine the result of Chinese 
economic reform from the perspective of cross-border M&As, two hypotheses are formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): the long-term cross-border M&A performance of Chinese SOEs and 
POEs shows an upward trend. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): the nature of State ownership and Private ownership of Chinese 
companies has the impact on their cross-border M&A performance. (Equity nature is correlated 
with cross-border M&A performance of Chinese companies) 
 
3. Empirical study I  
 
The chapter is aiming to design the comprehensive evaluation model on cross-border M&A 
performance and analyse the empirical result based on the comprehensive evaluation model. 
 




This paper selects all Chinese listed companies in mainland China exchanges that have 
cross-border M&A activities from 2014 to 2018 as the initial research samples. The source that 
the sample data came from is CSMAR database. The M&A behaviour defined in this article 
refers to the fact that listed companies obtain the property and control of the target company 
through equity acquisition, asset acquisition, or adopt the absorption and merger method to 
realise the rapid development for the company's expansion. This paper takes the completion 
date as the M&A date and selects cross-border M&As from 2014 to 2018 in which the buyer 
is a listed company in China. Based on these, samples are selected according to the following 
criteria:  
 
(1) Companies from Taiwan, which are not in mainland China’s capital market, are to be 
excluded. Although Taiwan is Chinese territories, this region is quite different from 
mainland China in terms of economy and social system. Additionally, the data of 
companies from Taiwan are generally absent in CSMAR database.  
 
(2) Concerning the companies with multiple records of cross-border M&A activities from 
2014 to 2018, only the records of the company's initial cross-border M&A activities are 
going to be kept. 
 
(3) Listed companies without sufficient relevant data and information are excluded. 
 
(4) The M&A companies should be listed three years earlier before the cross-border M&As 
and not delisted three years later after the cross-border M&As. 
 
(5) Because financial industry’s accounting standards are different from other industries, 
sample companies such as banks and securities are excluded. 
 
(6) ST and *ST listed companies are excluded because their financial data is abnormal, and 
they have the risks of being delisted in a short time.  
 
There are 859 initial samples. After the data filtration based on the criteria above, 94 




Table 1. Sample Description 
 Frequency 




Figure 2. Number of Samples 
 
 
3.2 Financial ratios selection 
 
This paper is using the accounting-based approach. As it is aforementioned above, the 
accounting-based approach can be divided into single indicator approach and comprehensive 
evaluation approach. Although many researchers use single indicator analysis approach to 
reduce the amounts of calculations. However, single indicator can’t sufficiently reflect a 
company’s financial performance. Therefore, this paper selects several initial financial ratios. 
By analysing whether the selected financial ratios are suitable for the research, financial ratios 
such as “Growth Rate of Total Assets” are excluded. The remained financial ratios are as 
followings: 
 
(1) Earning Capacity 
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1) Return on Assets (ROA). This indicator reflects the capability of a company to use 
its total assets to earn profits. 
 
2) Rate on Equity (ROE). This indicator reflects the level of return on shareholders’ 
equity, and it is used to measure the operating efficiency of the company’s own 
capital. 
 
3) Operating Profit Ratio (OPR). This indicator measures the ratio of the company’s 
operating profit to the operating revenue, reflecting the profitability of the company 
through its business operation. 
 
(2) Solvency  
1) Current Ratio (CR). This indicator is also called “Working Capital Ratio” or “Real 
Ratio”. It is an indicator to be used to measure the ability of a company to liquidate 
the current assets into cash for debt repayment before the short-term debt matures. 
Current assets include monetary capital, short-term investments, notes receivable, 
accounts receivable and inventory, etc., which can be liquidated or used within the 
business cycle of one year or more. 
 
2) Quick Ratio (QR). The indicator is also called “Acid Test”. It is an indicator to 
measure the capability of a company to repay current liabilities. Quick assets 
include cash, securities, notes receivable, accounts receivable, other receivables, 
etc., which can be liquidated in a relatively short period of time. 
 
3) Debt to Assets Ratio (Reciprocal). It is an indicator that is used to measure the 
company's ability to use the funds provided by creditors to operate business, and 
also reflects the degree of security of creditors' loans. Because it is a negative 
indicator, the reciprocal of this indicator is used here. 
 
4) Debt to Equity Ratio (Reciprocal). It is an indicator to measure the company's 
financial leverage, reflecting the degree of the debt used for financing the 
company’s operation. Because it is a negative indicator, the reciprocal of this 




(3) Operating capability  
1) Total Assets Turnover (TAT). It is an indicator that measures the ratio of the scale 
of asset investments to the level of sales. The higher the indicator means the higher 
the input-output ratio and the higher the profitability. It is also an indicator that 
directly affects the dividend distribution of listed companies in the capital market. 
 
2) Current Assets Turnover (CAT). This indicator reflects the turnover speed of the 
company's current assets. It analyses the utilisation efficiency of the company's 
current assets which have the strongest liquidity in the total assets of the company. 
It is one of the most important indicators that explains the main factors affecting the 
quality of the company’s assets 
 
(4) Shareholder Profitability  
Earnings per Share (EPS). It is one of the most important indicators that reflects a 
company’s profitability. In this paper, it is considered as an independent indicator out of 
the earning capacity. 
 
Table 2. Selected Indicators 
Type of Financial 
Indices Code Name formulae 
Earning Capacity 
W1 Return on Assets 
Net Profit/Average Balance of Total 
Assets 
W2 Return on Equity 
Net Profit/Average of Shareholders’ 
Equity 
W3 Operating Profit Ratio Operating Profit/Operating Revenue 
Solvency 
W4 Current Ratio Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
W5 Quick Ratio (Current Assets – Inventories)/Current Liabilities 
W6 
Debt to Assets 
Ratio 
(Reciprocal) 
Reciprocal of Total Liabilities/Total 
Assets 
W7 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
(Reciprocal) 










W9 Current Assets Turnover 





Share Net Profit/Total Shares 
 
 
3.3 Factor analysis and cross-border M&A performance 
 
We collect the financial data of 4 years before and after the cross-border M&A deals based 
on the selected 10 financial ratios. In the factor analysis, financial ratios will be compressed 
into the comprehensive scores. Hence, the common factors of each group of the financial ratios 
are to be extracted and then multiply their weights to form the scores of each group. Then a 
comprehensive score model is to be established.  
 
The comprehensive score model is as following: 
 
Fmi = ai1W1 + ai2W2 + ai3W3 + ai4W4 + ai5W5 + ai6W6 + ai7W7 + ai8W8 + ai9W9 + ai10W10  
 
In this model, Fmi represents the score of the m-th common factor in the i-th sample 
company. And a is the coefficient of the m-th common factor on the corresponding selected 
financial ratios (Taylor, Chen, et al. 2020).  
 
The next step is to build a comprehensive evaluation model. This model is based on scores 
of the common factors and the variance contribution rate of the extracted components. The 
comprehensive evaluation model is as following: 
 
Tiy = ci1Fi1 + ci2Fi2 + ci3Fi3 + ci4Fi4 + … + cimFim 
 
In this model, y is the relative time for the cross-border M&A event (from 2 years before 
M&A deal to 2 years after the M&A deal). Tiy means the comprehensive score of the cross-
border M&A performance of the i-th seleceted sample company in the year y. And the 
coefficient cim indicates the variance contribution rate of the m-th common factor (extracted 




The steps of factor analysis: 
 
1. Use SPSS 26.0 to do the dimensionality reduction analysis on the ten selected 
financial ratios. Then, conduct KMO and Bartlett’s Test to determine whether the 
selected financial ratios are suitable for factor analysis. 
 
2. Calculate the correlation coefficient matrix, then the variance contribution rates 
corresponding to the eigenvalues which are bigger than 1 are to be used as the main 
factor weight.  
 
3. Set up the load matrix, obtain the orthogonal rotation matrix with the largest 
variance, and derive the comprehensive score function. Then calculate the 
comprehensive scores of each sample company by using the selected financial ratios.  
 
KMO value is usually used for testing whether the data is suitable for factor analysis. If the 
KMO value is closer to 1, the correlation between the original data is also stronger. Then the 
data is more suitable for factor analysis. Normally, if the KMO value is greater than 0.6, the 
original variables are suitable for factor analysis. According to the table 2, the KMO values 
from T-2 to T2 are respectively 0.694, 0.660, 0.633, 0.705, and 0.650. They are all more than 
0.600. The significance level of each variable is 0.000, it means data is generally normally 
distributed. Therefore, the data of selected indicators is suitable for factor analysis. 
 
Table 3. KMO and Bartlett Sphericity test 
KMO and Bartlett's 
Test 
T-2 T-1 T0 T1 T2 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy 







1747.519 1267.204 1364.377 1957.152 1544.127 
df 45 45 45 45 45 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used for factor analysis on the cross-border M&A 
performance. In the table 4, the second column shows the communalities (the sum of the 
squared loadings for selected variables) while extracting the eigenvalues. If the effect of a 
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financial index is higher, the extraction of the original information from the variables is 
accordingly larger. Obviously, the extraction values of the financial indicators are all more than 
0.500, therefore the result of PCA is very ideal and the extracted common factors have very 
strong interpretation on the variables in this paper. 
 
Table 4. Communalities 
   Initial  Extraction  
 Return on Assets  1.000  .905  
 Return on Equity  1.000  .875  
 Operating Profit Ratio  1.000  .867  
 Current Ratio  1.000  .998  
 Quick Ratio  1.000  .996  
 Reciprocal - Debt to Assets 
Ratio 
 1.000  .996  
 Reciprocal - Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 1.000  .996  
 Total Assets Turnover  1.000  .849  
 Current Asset Turnover  1.000  .777  
 Earnings per Share  1.000  .546  
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 
 
According to Figure 3, the eigenvalues of the first 4 factors are more than 1.000, the 
eigenvalues of the last 6 factors are all less than 1.000 and the line connecting the 6 factors is 
relatively flat. Then, from the Table 5, the cumulative contribution rate of squared loadings of 
the first 4 factors and cumulative contribution rate of rotated squared loadings of the first 4 
factors are both more than 80%, therefore, selecting the first 4 factors with eigenvalues larger 
than 1 as the common factors for the scoring system of the cross-border M&A performance 
can interpret all the variables well. 
 






Table 5. Total Variance Explained 
 
 
Before the rotation of component Matrix, the loadings of all the variables on the first and 
second factors are relatively high, it means that the first and second factors have very high 
correlations with the variables. But the third and fourth factors doesn’t have a high correlation 
with the variable, it means that these factors don’t interpret the variables well. Therefore, the 
rotation method is applied.  
 
Table 6. Component Matrixa 
 
   Component 
 1  2  3 4 
Return on Assets  -.264  .907  .029 .108 
Return on Equity  -.436  .827  .028 -.010 
Operating Profit Ratio  -.242  .848  -.277 -.113 
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Current Ratio  .758  .316  .285 -.492 
Quick Ratio  .761  .324  .285 -.481 
Reciprocal - Debt to 
Assets Ratio 
 .790  .312  .140 .505 
Reciprocal - Debt to 
Equity Ratio 
 .788  .312  .145 .507 
Total Assets Turnover  -.430  .002  .810 .091 
Current Asset Turnover  -.577  -.039  .665 .038 
Earnings per Share  -.289  .674  -.091 .004 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 4 components extracted. 
 
The rotation method of Varimax is applied. Then, from Figure 4 after rotation, the 4 
components show the good interpretation for the 4 groups of variables. According to Table 7, 
the variables of “Return on Assets”, “Return on Equity”, “Operating Profit Ratio”, and 
“Earnings per Share” have really high loadings on the first factor. The variables of “Reciprocal 
– debt to assets ratio” and “Reciprocal – debt to equity ratio” have the high loadings on the 
second factor. The variables of “Current Ratio” and “Quick Ratio” have the high loadings on 
the third factor. The variables of “Total Assets Turnover” and “Current Assets Turnover” have 
high loadings on the fourth factor. In general, the factors after the rotation can have much better 
interpretation on the variables in comparison with the unrotated ones.  
 
 







   Table 7. Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
   Component 
 1  2  3 4 
Return on Assets  .930  .154  .017 .130 
Return on Equity  .914  -.058  -.027 .187 
Operating Profit Ratio  .910  -.066  .059 -.179 
Current Ratio  .002  .241  .964 -.101 
Quick Ratio  .008  .253  .960 -.101 
Reciprocal - Debt to 
Assets Ratio 
 .000  .955  .254 -.140 
Reciprocal - Debt to 
Equity Ratio 
 .001  .956  .253 -.134 
Total Assets Turnover  .039  -.044  -.038 .919 
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Current Asset Turnover  .070  -.209  -.150 .840 
Earnings per Share  .738  -.019  -.029 .023 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
 
According to the table 7, the factor analysis models are as followings: 
 
W1 = 0.930F1 + 0.154F2 + 0.017F3 + 0.130F4 
W2 = 0.914F1 – 0.058F2 – 0.027F3 + 0.187F4 
                                         … 
W10 = 0.738F1 – 0.019F2 – 0.029F3 + 0.023F4 
 
These models reflect the degree of interpretation of each component to the selected 
financial ratios. 
 
Table 8 is the component score covariance matrix of the 4 factors. This matrix demonstrates 
the correlation relationship between extracted components. It is very obvious that these 4 
factors (extracted components) are not correlated. Therefore, the design for factor analysis is 
very suitable for establishing the scoring system of the cross-border M&A performance. 
 
Table 8. Component Score Covariance Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 
1 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
2 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
3 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
4 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.   
 Component Scores. 
 
 
Table 9 is the component score coefficient Matrix. The method of regression is applied for 





Table 9. Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
Return on Assets .298 .107 -.035 .058 
Return on Equity .292 -.015 .005 .066 
Operating Profit Ratio .308 -.092 .035 -.168 
Current Ratio -.007 -.146 .561 .043 
Quick Ratio -.005 -.136 .555 .044 
Reciprocal - Debt to Assets 
Ratio 
-.003 .550 -.135 .047 
Reciprocal - Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
-.003 .551 -.136 .051 
Total Assets Turnover -.034 .096 .063 .593 
Current Asset Turnover -.017 .009 .033 .510 
Earnings per Share .242 -.007 -.020 -.028 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
 Component Scores. 
 
According to the Table 9, comprehensive score functions are as followings: 
 
F1 = 0.298W1 + 0.292W2 + 0.308W3 – 0.007W4 – 0.005W5 – 0.003W6 – 0.003W7 
– 0.034W8 – 0.017W9 + 0.242W10 
F2 = 0.107W1 – 0.015W2 – 0.092W3 – 0.146W4 – 0.136W5 + 0.550W6 + 0.551W7 
+ 0.096W8 + 0.009W9 – 0.007W10 
F3 = -0.035W1 + 0.005W2 + 0.035W3 + 0.561W4 + 0.555W5 – 0.135W6 – 0.136W7 
+ 0.063W8 + 0.033W9 – 0.020W10 
F4 = 0.058W1 + 0.066W2 – 0.168W3 + 0.043W4 + 0.044W5 + 0.047W6 + 0.051W7 
+ 0.593W8 + 0.510W9 – 0.028W10 
 
Then, we calculate the score of each sample company on each factor according to the factor 
loading matrix of each year and use the variance contribution rate to assign the weight of the 
common factor to get the comprehensive evaluation model of each sample company in each 
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year. Therefore, the model of the comprehensive financial performance (comprehensive 
evaluation model) of the year of the cross-border M&A transaction is as following: 
 
T0 = (30.786F1 + 20.247F2 + 20.098F3 + 16.927F4)/88.058 
 
Following the steps above, the functions of the comprehensive financial performance of the 
second year before the cross-border M&A event, the year before the cross-border M&A event, 
the year after the cross-border M&A event, and the second year after the cross-border M&A 
event can be derived. The concrete steps are the same as the aforementioned steps, therefore 
they are not shown on this page due to the space limitations. Hence, the models are as 
followings:  
 
T-2 = (38.979F1 + 30.655F2 + 18.900F3)/88.535 (3 components extracted) 
T-1 = (39.137F1 + 29.128F2 + 17.624F3)/85.889 (3 components extracted) 
T1 = (36.286F1 + 32.351F2 + 17.108F3)/85.746 (3 components extracted) 
T2 = (36.731F1 + 34.948F2 + 16.529F3)/88.207 (3 components extracted) 
 
3.4 The result of factor analysis on the cross-border M&A performance 
 
3.4.1 The comprehensive performance scores of all samples 
 
According to the result of comprehensive financial performance scores calculated by SPSS, 
Excel then is used to sort out the comprehensive financial performance scores of the sample 
companies, calculate and summarise the average of the annual comprehensive scores. They are 
presented in Table 10 and Figure 5. 
 
Table 10. Summary of the means of comprehensive performance scores 




-0.034605 -0.044577 -0.018568 0.020076 0.049826 
 





From Figure 5, the trend of cross-border M&A performance shows relatively upward. 
During the two years before a Chinese company has completed its cross-border M&A event, 
the trend of company’s financial performance has an approximate v shape, it goes downward 
at first and then goes upward. From the year when the company completes its cross-border 
M&A event to the second year after the M&A event, the financial performance of the company 
shows a stable upward trend, it goes up quickly in the first year and slightly slows down in the 
second year. 
 
3.4.2 The comparison between SOEs and POEs regarding the cross-border performance 
 
The comprehensive performance scores are sorted out by Excel and presented in Table 11. 
Figure 6 well reflects the changing trend of cross-border M&A performance of Chinese SOEs 
and POEs. Although, the general cross-border M&A performance shows an upward trend 
grosso modo, Chinese POEs and SOEs respectively show the different trend in the long-term 
cross-border M&A performance. For Chinese POEs, they have a flat but slightly downward 
trend in the long-term M&A performance. But for Chinese SOEs, their performance trade is 
closely similar to the general trend in Figure 5, it goes upward generally. Additionally, before 
the cross-border M&A event, Chinese SOEs have negative financial performance, but after the 
cross-border M&A event, the financial performance of SOEs goes up quickly and then become 
positive within the first year after cross-border M&A event. 
 
Table 11. Means of comprehensive performance scores 
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SOEs -0.087073 -0.112161 -0.046721 0.050515 0.125368 
POEs 0.017861 0.023007 0.009584 -0.010362 -0.025717 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of the trend of cross-border M&A performance  
 
 
3.5 Analysis of the result 
 
The performance trend of Chinese SOEs demonstrated in Figure 6 is basically consistent 
with one aspect in the hypothesis 4 that Chinese SOEs have an upward trend in terms of the 
long-term cross-border M&A performance. But the hypothesis is not completely supported by 
the result in Figure 6, because the long-term cross-border M&A performance of Chinese POEs 
doesn’t show an upward trend. With respect to the result, it can basically prove that the 
economic reform on Chinese SOEs by Chinese government in terms of cross-border M&A 
sector is effective. The cross-border M&As have brought about the substantial positive changes 
into the long-term performance of Chinese SOEs. Since Chinese president Xi Jinping came 
into power in 2012, the Chinese government under the leadership of president Xi has proposed 
to comprehensively improve the level of open economy and emphasised adapting to the new 
situation of economic globalization. And the reform on Chinese economic system, especially 
on Chinese corporates, has been widened and deepened (Tian, et al., 2021). Meanwhile, with 
the launch of Chinese “Belt and Road initiative”, Chinese government encouraged Chinese 
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companies (both SOEs and POEs) to actively perform outbound investments, especially in the 
cross-border M&A field (Guo & Han, 2021). In accordance with the reform, Chinese 
government has published measures and beneficial policies for supporting Chinese SOE and 
POEs’ cross-border M&A transactions without the direct political interference and support that 
may go against the open and free market principles. Therefore, taking into the Chinese reform 
context into consideration, the empirical result reflects that the corporate reform under the 
leadership of Chinese president Xi has brought about enormous positive effects on the cross-
border M&A performance of Chinese SOEs. On the contrary, the restrictions on Chinese POEs 
in terms of cross-border M&As are much less than these on Chinese SOEs under the corporate 
reform, Chinese POEs don’t have a satisfactory long-term performance by performing the 
cross-border M&A and even have the downward-trend performance by the cross-border M&A 
transactions. This situation is worthy of much concern from Chinese economic reformers. 
Because the core of the corporate reform is to strengthen the status of Chinese POEs as the 
main players in Chinese market in order to further open Chinese market and enhance the 
economic vitality. If Chinese POEs can’t fully play their due roles in the capital market, the 
Chinese government's comprehensive and deep opening-up reform plan in the next stage will 
be definitely affected. The next chapter is to analyse the impact of ownership structure on cross-
border M&A for explaining the reason that leads to the different performance of Chinese SOEs 
and POEs in terms of cross-border M&A transactions. 
 
4. Empirical study II 
 
This chapter is aiming to examine the impact of ownership structure on cross-border M&A 
performance by conducting regression analysis and analyse the regression results. Then based 
on the results analysis, to provide proper managerial implications and policy suggestions for 
Chinese companies and Chinese government. 
 
4.1 Variable description and model design 
 
In order to examine the impact of ownership structure on cross-border M&A performance, 
the difference of performance scores which can generally reflect the dynamic changes in the 
financial performance of the company before and after cross-border M&A deals is used as the 
dependent variable and DPER is used to represent the depend variable. In the former part, T-2, 
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T-1, T0, T1, T2 are used to represent the comprehensive performance scores before and after 
cross-border M&A deals respectively. Therefore, the differences of the comprehensive 
performance scores in the paper are T2-T-2, T2-T-1, T2-T0, T2-T1, T1-T0. 
 
According to the theories and concepts of ownership structure analysed in the former 
section, there are 4 independent variables in this paper. They are degree of restriction on the 
largest shareholder’s controlling right/power, ownership concentration, rate of executive shares, 
and equity nature. The data of the variables is collected from CSMAR database. The balance 
of power in ownership is reflected by the comparison between the shareholdings of other large 
stakeholders and the shareholding of the largest shareholder. The ownership concentration 
measures the company’s equity distribution and reflects the situation of corporate governance. 
The rate of executive shares shows the situation of executive ownership in the company, and it 
is the basis for the research on the effect of the equity incentive plan. The equity nature is the 
key indicator to distinguish POEs and SOEs. 
 
(1) Degree of Restriction on the Largest Shareholder’s Controlling right/Power (BOP) 
Degree of Restriction on the Largest Shareholder’s Controlling right/Power = the 
shareholdings of the second and third largest shareholders/ the shareholding of the 
largest shareholder 
 
(2) Ownership concentration (OCN) 
Ownership concentration = the sum of squares of the share ratios of the top three 
major shareholders (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) 
 
(3) Rate of executive shares (Executive ownership) (ROES) 
Rate of executive shares = Total executive shares/ Total shares 
 
(4) Equity nature (ENT) 
Equity nature = 0 or 1 (dummy variable); SOE = 1, POE = 0 
 
We have selected two control variables which are not involved in the research but 
influencing the financial performance and quite possibly affecting the result of the research. 
These control variables are related party transaction and major assets restructuring. Related 
party transactions are very common under the environment of market economy. On the one 
 
 39 
hand, related party transaction can reduce the transactional costs. On the other hand, related 
party transaction may cause the damage to the interests of small shareholders under some 
specific circumstances. Major assets restructuring refers to the asset transaction of the listed 
company and its controlling company to purchase and sell equity to a certain extent, which is 
a long-term equity investment. 
 
(1) Related party transaction (RPT) 
Related party transaction = 0 or 1 (dummy variable); M&A event of related party 
transaction = 1, M&A event not with related party transaction = 0 
 
(2) Major assets restructuring (MAR) 
Major assets restructuring = 0 or 1 (dummy variable); M&A deal related to major 
assets restructuring = 1, M&A deal not related to major assets restructuring = 0 
 
Based on the research hypotheses and the variables selected, we establish the multiple 
regression model to examine the impact of ownership structure on the cross-border M&A 
performance. The model is as following: 
 
DPER = b0 + b1BOP + b2OCN + b3ROES + b4ENT + b5RPT + b6MAR + e 
 
The data of selected variables in the year of T0 is demonstrated in table 12. Z-reciprocal is 
the ratio of the sum of shares of the 2nd and 3rd largest shareholders to the shares of the largest 
shareholder, reflecting the degree of restriction from the 2nd and 3rd large shareholders on the 
largest shareholder. In Table 12, the median and mean of the Z-reciprocal are both more than 
40%, it shows that, in the collected data, the 2nd and 3rd shareholders form a relatively large 
restriction over the controlling power of the largest shareholder. Concentration-3 is the sum of 
shares of the top 3 large shareholders, directly reflecting to what degree the ownership is 
concentrated in a certain group of shareholders. Herfindahl-3 is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index which is widely applied in economics and used to measure the degree of ownership 
distribution. It can better measure the ownership concentration, but it is not as direct as the 
normal concentration indicator to reflect the ownership concentration situation. In this paper, 
the variable of Herfindahl-3 is the sum of squares of the share ratios of the top three major 
shareholders. According to the statistics of Concentration-3 in table 12, the ownership of top 3 
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shareholders is around 30% in general. Therefore, in the collected data, the ownership of 
sample companies is concentrated but not highly in few large shareholders. At the same time, 
the statistics of Herfindahl-3 are much lower than 1, thus the ownership in the sample 
companies is uniformly distributed. The statistics of rate of executive shares, reflecting the 
level of the executive ownership, have the median of 0.0275595 and the mean of 0.0684187. 
So, the degree of executive ownership is not conspicuous in the collected date of sample 
companies. Relevance sign and major restructuring sign are the dummies, reflecting whether 
the sample company’s cross-border M&A transaction is related part transaction, or the sample 
company conducts cross-border M&A transaction related to the major assets restructuring. 
According to the statistics, in the collected, there are around one fifth of sample companies 
have the related part transaction in cross-border M&A and around one third of sample 
companies conducted cross-border M&A related to major assets restructuring. The data of 
selected variables of Z-reciprocal, Concentration-3, and Herfindahl-3 in the year of T-2, T-1, T1 
shows the highly similar pattern, hence it is not presented here to avoid redundant 
demonstration and explanation. 
 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std. Deviation 
Z-reciprocal 94 .011204 1.00000 .4012820 .4199289 .29318370 
Concentration_3 94 .017694 .819354 .2976720 .3230569 .20613027 
Herfindahl_3 94 .000022 .423629 .0275595 .0684187 .09123500 
RateOfExecutiveSha
res 
94 .000000 .657359 .0299804 .1400307 .18138517 
RelevanceSign 94 0 1 0 .19 .396 
MajorRestructuringS
ign 
94 0 1 0 .27 .444 
Valid N (listwise) 94      
 
 
Table 13. Selected Variables 
Type of Variables Abbreviation Name of Variables Definition of Variables 
 
 41 




The performance score 




Degree of restriction 




the sum of shares of the 
second and third largest 
shareholders/ shares of 
the largest shareholder 
OCN Ownership Concentration  
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index，the sum of 
squares of the share 
ratios of the top three 
major shareholders 
 
ROES Rate of Executive Shares 
Total Executive Shares/ 
Total Shares 
ENT Equity Nature 
Dummy variable, SOEs, 
the value is “1”; POEs, 
the value is “0” 
Control Variable 
 
RPT Related Party Transaction 
Dummy variable, if the 
M&A is related party 
transaction, the value is 
“1”; If not, the value is 
“0” 
MAR Major Assets Restructuring 
Dummy variable, if the 
M&A is related to the 
major assets 
restructuring, the value 






4.2 Multicollinearity test 
 
Before conducting the regression analysis, it is necessary to take the multicollinearity test 
to ensure that the independent variables for the regression analysis are not correlated. If there 
are high correlations between independent variables, problems will emerge while fitting the 
model and interpreting the results. The paper assesses the multicollinearity by variance 
inflation factor (VIF). Generally speaking, if VIF is more than 10, it indicates that there is a 
serious multicollinearity, and the independent variable is not suitable for regression analysis. 
If VIF is less than 10, the multicollinearity is not serious, and the independent variable can be 
used for regression analysis. According to the results of multicollinearity test shown in table 
14 by applying SPSS 26.0, the VIFs between variables are all less than 3. Therefore, it is 
obvious that there are no multicollinearity problems between the selected independent variables 
and the independent variables are available for regression analysis. 
 
Table 14. Collinearity Statistics 
 T2 – T-2 T2 – T-1 T2 – T0 T2 – T1 T1 – T0 
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
BOP 1.421 1.268 1.340 1.279 1.340 
OCN  2.105 1.622 1.506 1.466 1.506 
ROES 1.479 1.641 1.489 1.622 1.489 
ENT 1.670 1.538 1.573 1.520 1.573 
RPT 1.356 1.384 1.317 1.350 1.317 








After the multicollinearity test, we performed multiple regression analysis in SPSS26.0. 
The results are shown in table 15.  
 
Table 15. Regression Results 
 
T2 – T-2 T2 – T-1 T2 – T0 T2 – T1 T1 – T0 
Constant 
Coefficients  0.090 0.140 0.177 0.147 0.282 
t statistics 0.582 0.705 1.041 0.711 1.776 
BOP 
Coefficients -0.369*** -0.216* -0.324*** -0.302*** -0.328*** 
t statistics -3.100 -2.046 -2.797 -2.661 -2.809 
OCN  
Coefficients 0.235* -0.177 -0.121 -0.059 -0.139 
t statistics 1.622 -1.396 -0.985 -0.487 -1.125 
ROES 
Coefficients 0.099 0.157 0.174 0.186 0.074 
t statistics  0.814 1.269 1.425 1.457 0.601 
ENT 
Coefficients 0.169 0.276** 0.091 0.071 0.090 




Coefficients 0.040 -0.025 0.017 0.018 -0.126 
t statistics 0.343 -0.211 0.152 0.158 -1.086 
MAR 
Coefficients -0.002 -0.009 0.145 0.164 0.081 
t statistics -0.020 -0.084 1.299 1.495 0.721 
Adjusted R Square 0.083 0.041 0.070 0.062 0.055 
Durbin-Watson 1.968 2.015 2.180 2.032 1.912 
F Statistics 2.229** 1.644* 2.172* 2.032* 1.898* 
N.B.: ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
From table 15, we can see that all models have passed the F test, showing the significant 
levels at 10% at least. Therefore, the regression models are effective for the impact of 
ownership structure on the cross-border M&A performance. The Durbin-Watson values from 
the regression results are all close to 2. Hence there is no autocorrelation problems between 
independent variables. However, the value of adjusted r square of each regression model is 
around or less than 0.1, it indicates that each regression model doesn’t have a high degree of 
fitting. Hence the regression models can interpret the changes in the cross-border M&A 
performance to some extent, but not fully.  
 
(1) The degree of restriction on the largest shareholder’s controlling right/power (BOP) and 
the cross-border M&A performance 
According to the result of regression Analysis in table 15, the degree of restriction on the 
largest shareholder’s controlling right/power (BOP) is negatively correlated with the cross-
border M&A performance. The significant levels of BOP are at 1% on models of T2-T-2, T2-
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T0, T2-T1, T1-T0, 5% on T2-T-1. Therefore, BOP influences the cross-border M&A performance 
negatively, the controlling right/power of the largest shareholder is more restricted by other 
large shareholders, the M&A performance will be more negatively affected. Then, hypothesis 
2 is confirmed by the result.  
 
(2) Ownership concentration (OCN) and the cross-border M&A performance 
According to the result in table 15, ownership concentration is only positively corrected 
with the cross-border M&A performance on the model of T2-T-2, but negatively corrected with 
it in others model. Furthermore, the coefficient of correlation of OCN is only significant at 10% 
on the first model, but not on other models. Therefore, the concentrated ownership or dispersed 
ownership doesn’t have the significant impact on the changes in the cross-border M&A 
performance neither positively nor negatively. Then, hypothesis 1 is not supported by the result. 
 
(3) Rate of executive shares (executive ownership) (ROES) and the cross-border M&A 
performance 
According to the result in table 15, rate of executive shares (executive ownership) shows a 
positive correlation with the cross-border M&A performance on all models. However, the 
coefficient of ROES is not significant at any time. Thus, it indicates that the equity incentive 
plan for executives doesn’t have a significant impact on the cross-border M&A performance. 
Therefore, hypothesis 3 is not well supported by the empirical result. 
 
(4) Equity nature (status of SOE and POE of Chinese companies) (ENT) and the cross-
border M&A performance 
From the result in table 15, the coefficient of equity on all models is positive, but only 
significant at 5% on T2 – T-1. It indicates that the regression results can’t support that the equity 
nature of a company can affect the cross-border M&A performance in general. Then, the 6th 
hypothesis is rejected by the empirical result.  
 
4.4 Robustness test 
 
To examine the robustness and effectiveness of the regression results, the paper conducts 
the robustness test. The ratio of shareholdings of the second and third largest shareholders to 
the largest shareholder is replaced by the ratio of shareholdings of the second, third and fourth 
largest shareholders to the largest shareholder, the sum of squares of the share ratios of the top 
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three large shareholders is replaced by the sum of squares of the share ratios of the top ten large 
shareholders, the dummy variable of equity nature is replaced by the variable of rate of state 
shares, the dummy variable of Major Assets Restructuring is replaced by the variable of 
expense value of M&A deals.  
 
Then, by performing the regression analysis in SPSS 26.0, the results are produced and 
shown in table 16 and table 17. According to table 16, there is no multicollinearity as VIFs 
between variables are all less than 10. From the table 17, the results are similar to the results 
table 15. There are only few differences, the coefficients of the variable of ownership 
concentration and the variable of expense value are significant on T1-T0. In general, the results 
of robustness confirm hypothesis 2 and reject hypothesis 1, hypothesis 3, and hypothesis 6, 
consistent with the results from the empirical analysis of the impact of ownership structure on 
the cross-border M&A performance. 
 
Table 16. Collinearity Statistics 
 T2 – T-2 T2 – T-1 T2 – T0 T2 – T1 T1 – T0 
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Ratio of 
shareholdings 




to the largest 
shareholder 
1.347 1.262 1.334 1.510 1.334 
HHI-10 1.578 1.603 1.459 1.257 1.459 
ROES 1.369 1.652 1.505 1.090 1.505 
Rate of state 
shares 1.087 1.524 1.168 1.190 1.168 
RPT 1.155 1.389 1.215 1.168 1.215 





Table 17. Regression Results 
 
T2 – T-2 T2 – T-1 T2 – T0 T2 – T1 T1 – T0 
Constant 
Coefficients  0.332 0.541 0.641 0.516 1.351 
t statistics 0.826 1.252 1.541 1.183 3.661 
Ratio of 
sharehold










Coefficients -0.323*** -0.244** -0.364*** -0.327** -0.393*** 
t statistics -2.751 -2.013 -3.115 -2.884 -3.515 
HHI-10 
Coefficients 0.218* -0.095 -0.149 -0.055 -0.199* 
t statistics 1.710 -0.772 -1.220 -0.443 -1.707 
ROES 
Coefficients 0.034 0.131 0.129 0.156 0.006 




Coefficients 0.119 0.084 0.060 0.063 0.085 
t statistics 1.129 0.781 0.546 0.567 0.817 
RPT Coefficients 0.086 0.085 0.079 -0.074 -0.059 
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t statistics 0.793 0.763 0.709 0.655 -0.550 
Expense 
value 
Coefficients -0.091 -0.107 -0.104 -0.084 -0.306*** 
t statistics -0.850 -0.992 -0.965 -0.786 -2.985 
Adjusted R Square 0.055 0.040 0.049 0.097 0.129 
Durbin-Watson 1.941 2.014 2.153 2.111 1.726 
F Statistics 1.757* 1.642* 1.800* 1.573 3.304*** 
N.B.: ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
4.5 Result analysis 
 
The empirical result has shown that the degree of restriction on the largest shareholder’s 
controlling right/power (BOP) is high in a company, the company will have higher cross-border 
M&A performance of Chinese. But the result doesn’t provide the adequate evidence to prove 
that other factors, ownership concentration (OCN), executive ownership (rate of executive 
shares) (ROES), and equity nature (status of SOE and POE of Chinese companies) (ENT), have 
the correlations with cross-border M&A performance of Chinese. This basically demonstrates 
that the internal actor of a Chinese company plays an important role in the company’s M&A 
transaction in term terms of the M&A performance, if the largest shareholder has relatively 
high controlling power in comparison to other large shareholders, the largest shareholder will 
be possible to lead a company to make the sensible M&A decision and the company will be 
more likely to be beneficial from the cross-border M&A transaction, showing a high M&A 
performance.  
 
Normally, the stakeholder theory can basically explain why BOP can influence cross-border 
M&A performance without considering the difference of SOEs and POEs in the Chinese 
context, because the largest shareholder who controls the company in practice and has the 
absolute decision power will consider the interest of the company as its own interest, and M&A 
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is always considered as an important and effective strategy for bringing benefits to the company, 
thus he/she will do their best to make the right M&A decision. But, as it has been analysed in 
the former chapter, Chinese SOEs have the positive long-term cross-border M&A performance 
and the performance of Chinese POEs are contrary, showing a downward trend. So, stakeholder 
theory seems not sufficient and even incorrect to explain this situation in general. According 
to the stakeholder theory, the largest shareholder or a group of shareholders have the ultimate 
decision-making power. For large shareholders in Chinese POEs, they are indeed the decision 
makers, but in most Chinese SOEs, the largest shareholder or the true owner (State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of municipal government, provincial 
government, or central government) who is the stakeholder of the company actually doesn’t 
make any decision regarding company’s affairs. The decision-making power of the largest 
shareholder in Chinese is actually transferred to the executives from the actual controller 
according to the Supervision and Administration of State-owned Assets of Enterprises Tentative 
Regulat promulgated by the State Council of China on 27 May 2003 (revised in 2011 and 2019 
respectively). In addition, the nature of executives in SOEs is different from it in POEs. The 
executives of Chinese POEs are generally the external personnel hired by the company and the 
agency problem in Chinese POEs can be well explained by the agency theory. But the 
executives in most Chinese SOEs are not the absolute external personnel. Unlike the ones in 
POEs, they are the government officials who are appointed to the SOEs to work as the 
executives by the Chinese Communist Party (Li, Zhang & Xie, 2020). Their official status is 
transferred into the corporate and when they are appointed back to the government position by 
the communist party, their status will be transferred to the governmental one again. Under this 
model, the motives for the executives in Chinese SOEs are mostly political-power-driven (Bai 
& An, 2021), that is to say when they have made great contribution to the company, bringing 
about huge benefits to the company, they will be nominated by the Chinese Communist Party 
to work in government with a much higher position than before. Then, the position as the 
executive in SOEs is a good place for official to be trained for a higher position in government 
(Huang, 2020). Therefore, in order to get promoted by the party, executives in SOEs are more 
willing to try their best to work for the benefits of the company than the executives in POEs 
whose motives are mostly benefit-driven. And the M&A decisions made by executives in SOEs 
are more possible to create huge benefits for the companies. Hence, both agency theory and 
stakeholder theory failed to explain the good performance of Chinese SOEs in term of cross-




At the same time, the ownership of Chinese SOEs and POEs are generally concentrated in 
several large shareholders at the present stage of corporate reform (Ni, Hua & Wu, 2014), so 
the ownership concertation is a universal phenomenon in Chinese context. that’s why the 
ownership concentration has been tested that not correlated to the cross-border M&A 
performance of Chinese companies under the selected data. But the largest shareholder of 
Chinese SOEs is State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of 
municipal government, provincial government, or central government, which are represented 
the control of the nation to the companies, and other large shareholders are unwilling to 
supervise the largest shareholder of the SOEs and executives of the SOEs because the 
supervision cost is too high, and they are afraid of being too much against the power of 
government. So, being free riders are more beneficial for them. Although the internal 
supervision mechanism is not effective for Chinese SOEs, Chinese Communist Party has 
established an extremely effective external supervision mechanism for SOEs. It is that the 
Communist Party committee participate in the corporate governance, and the committee is only 
responsible for the Chinese Communist Party and not restrained by the company. Because 
China governed by Communist Party, then the Communist Party committee, reflecting the 
authority and leadership of Chinese Communist Party, can directly supervise over the 
executives in SOEs who have the decision-making power and are sure to be the member of 
Chinese Communists party and all other personnel. Therefore, in Chinese SOEs, they have a 
complete and efficient supervision system. And, as aforementioned, decision makers in 
Chinese SOEs are not benefit-driven. So, the executives in Chinese SOEs can make scientific 
and meaning M&A decisions, and efficiently performed the high-quality M&A transactions. It 
is well explained why Chinese SOEs, whose largest shareholder has the absolute controlling 
power not restricted by other larger shareholders, but without decision-making power, and 
which don’t have effective internal supervision system, can have positive upward-trend cross-
border M&A performance in accordance with the confirmed hypothesis 1. 
 
On the contrary, the largest shareholders in Chinese POEs can’t make decision smoothly, 
because their controlling right/ power are restricted by the other shareholders. Unlike the other 
large shareholders in Chinese SOEs, other large shareholders are much more willing to use 
their ownership to restrict the largest shareholders for maximizing their benefits. In China, 
companies are benefit-driven, the large shareholders of Chinese POEs are more likely to be 
caught in the conflicts of interests with each other. For examples, some famous Chinese 
companies (Dangdang, NVC Lighting, Zhejiang Reclaim Holding Group, etc) are or were on 
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the verge of bankruptcy due to the internal conflicts between shareholders. In another word, 
the restriction on the largest shareholder’s controlling right/power by other large shareholders 
leads to the consequence of the failure of internal corporate governance mechanism. And 
Chinese POEs doesn’t have a strong external supervision mechanism that Chinese SOEs have. 
Therefore, even if the largest shareholder in Chinese POE has made a sensible M&A decision, 
other large shareholders may impede the M&A decision through the board of directors for their 
own interests. Or the largest shareholder makes the compromise with other shareholders to 
make M&A transactions which may be only beneficial to their own interest but bring about 
nothing even damage to the company and other small shareholders’ interests. Then, it is well 
explained the impact of degree of controlling right/ power of the largest shareholder on the 
cross-border M&A performance from the perspective of Chinese POEs. 
 
4.6 Managerial and policy implications 
 
Based on the empirical result and the analysis on the result, the paper is to provide 
suggestions for Chinese POEs and Chinese government of all levels.  
 
At first, the suggestions for Chinese POEs. As it is analysed in the former part, the largest 
shareholders in Chinese POEs are generally restricted by other large shareholders, the very 
possible internal interest-driven conflicts between large shareholders in Chinese POEs lead to 
the consequence of the failure of the internal governance mechanism. Additionally, Chinese 
POEs don’t have a sound and effective external supervision mechanism, both the behaviours 
of largest shareholder and other large shareholders, the decision-making group, are not 
supervised and restrained (Liao & Wu, 2021). Therefore, the cross-border transactions under 
the failed internal governance mechanism and the lack of external supervision can’t really bring 
the benefits to the company and small shareholders, but more possibly create the benefits for 
the small group of large shareholders. Therefore, there are 3 suggestions proposed by the paper 
from the perspective of Chinese POEs for improving the decision-making efficiency in the 
cross-border M&A activities and the supervision efficiency: 
 
(1) Relationship coordination. To coordinate the relationships between the largest 
shareholder and other large shareholders to avoid the excessive internal disputes of the self-




(2) Optimisation of the ownership structure. The largest shareholder can increase his/her 
shareholdings for strengthening the controlling right/power, enhancing the decision-making 
power for all corporate affairs, especially in the cross M&A transactions, and by applying this 
the influence from other large shareholders on the decision-making process will be weakened. 
But this suggestion is based on that the largest shareholder is willing invest more capital for 
obtaining larger controlling right/power. Therefore, this suggestion can be effective, but costly 
as well.  
 
(3)  Improvement of the external supervision mechanism. To improve the decision-making 
efficiency based on the former two suggestions doesn’t mean that the scientific and beneficial 
decisions can be made. Without the not benefit-driven supervision, the decision makers will 
highly possibly make the benefits for their own interests. Therefore, the paper suggests that the 
government should establish or improve the external supervision mechanism for the company. 
The concrete method is introduced in the suggestions for government part. 
 
Secondly, the suggestions for government. Based on the empirical results and analysis, it is 
confident to say that Chinese government under the leadership of President Xi has successfully 
performed the reform on the Chinese SOEs at the new stage of economic reform since 2012. 
The sound decision-making mechanism and efficient corporate supervision mechanism has 
been established. At the same, with the participation of non-state capital in Chinese SOEs, the 
economic vitality of Chinese SOEs is simulated, and Chinese SOEs get more used to the 
competition under the market economy environment. That’s why the M&A transactions made 
by Chinese SOEs can well change the companies’ performance in a long run. Therefore, the 
paper proposes that: 
 
(1) To deepen the reform of Chinese SOEs. At the present stage, the reform on Chinese 
SOEs doesn’t cover the SOEs from all industries. The successful reform at the present stage 
has provided the best paradigm for the more profound and comprehensive corporate reform in 
the next stage after 2021. Therefore, Chinese can and must have the confidence to expand the 
scope of the reform on Chinese SOEs and realise the comprehensive reform and opening-up 
for Chinese economy.  
 
(2) To promote the supervision mechanism of the Communist Party committee. Although 
the reform on SOEs is successful, the reform on Chinese POEs hasn’t produced good results 
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in terms of cross-border M&As. The loose policies made by Chinese government for Chinese 
POEs doesn’t bring about positive benefits for Chinese POEs. Some owners of Chinese POEs 
have even turned the enterprises and cross-border M&A transactions into a money laundering 
and asset transfer tools under the loose loan policy and regulatory policy (for instance, Wanda 
Group was punished by the Chinese government for allegedly transferring assets through cross-
border M&A transactions). Therefore, it is urgent for the establishment of an external 
supervision mechanism while the failing of internal supervision mechanism in Chinese POEs. 
The supervision mechanism of the Communist Party committee in Chinese SOEs have been 
basically proved successful at present. Actually, according to Company Law of the People's 
Republic of China, Chinese company needs to establish an organization of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Party committee) to carry out party activities within the company in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, and the 
company should provide necessary conditions for the activities of the Party organization. 
Chinese SOEs have followed this law really well. However, for most Chinese POEs, they 
indeed have their companies’ Party committee. But the company’s Party committee is in a form 
of an empty shell, participants are only the internal personnel of the company, and the 
committee is under the leadership of the company. So, the external supervision mechanism 
becomes an ineffective internal supervision mechanism in Chinese POE. Therefore, the paper 
propose that Chinese government needs to assign the external party and government personnel 
to the company’s Party committee to guide the supervision tasks. Then the external supervision 
mechanism can be really activated and improve Chinese POE’s performance not only in terms 




The paper has studied the impact of ownership structure on cross-border M&A performance 
of Chinese companies by comparing the different performance between Chinese SOEs and 
POEs at first and then testing the relationships between equity ownership and cross-border 
M&A performance, between the degree of restriction on the controlling right/power of the 
largest shareholder and cross-border M&A performance, between ownership concentration and 
cross-border M&A performance, and between executive ownership and cross-border M&A 
performance. The first empirical study by factor analysis shows that Chinese SOEs have an 
upward-trend performance by conducting cross-border M&A transactions, but Chinese POEs 
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have a smooth and slightly downward-trend M&A performance through cross-border M&A 
transactions. By conducting the regression analysis, the second empirical study shows that the 
degree of restriction on the controlling right/power of the largest shareholder is negatively 
correlated with cross-border M&A performance. Therefore, the largest shareholder can’t make 
effective and efficient decision under the large ownership restriction from the other large 
shareholders. However, other selected variables are not consistently significant in the 
regression models, thus, there is no confidence to prove that these variables are correlated with 
cross-border M&A performance neither positively nor negatively.  
 
By analysing the results from empirical studies, the paper offers practical managerial 
implications and policy suggestions for Chinese companies and Chinese government by taking 
the real cases in Chinese market and the real situation of Chinese corporate reform into 
consideration. The majority suggestions are for Chinese government. 
 
However, there are still some limitations in the study. Firstly, there are many factors in 
ownership structure affecting cross-border M&A performance, then only by selecting few 
factors in ownership structure, the results of empirical studies can’t 100% explain the 
relationships between ownership structure and cross-border M&A performance. Secondly, the 
paper doesn’t take the different M&A destinations into consideration, which is largely possibly 
impacting the M&A performance between Chinese SOEs and POEs. So, by only explaining 
the different performance from the perspective of corporate reform, the result is limited to some 
extent. Thirdly, the paper is analysing the impact of ownership structure on cross-border M&A 
performance in Chinese context, so, considering the unique characteristic of Chinese market 
and the nature of Chinese government, the managerial implications and policy suggestions are 
limited and not suitable to companies and governments of other countries. Fourthly, the 
managerial implications and policy suggestions are mainly about the external factors on the 
Chinese companies that can improve the cross-border performance. Especially for Chinese 
POEs, under the failure of internal corporate governance mechanism, the external mechanism 
is suggested as the most efficient way to mitigate the negative impact from the internal factors. 
Therefore, the further study for offering the methods for improving the internal mechanism is 
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Appendix: Processed data of companies’ information  
 








































Media Co., Ltd. 
Redrover Co., Ltd. 
000811 2015-08-11 烟台冰轮股份
有限公司 
Yantai Moon Co., Ltd. Yantai Moon Group 















Machinery Co., Ltd. 
Smart Union 
Resources (Hong 

















DHY & Co., Ltd. 
002024 2016-01-04 Great Sunrise 
Limited 
Great Sunrise Limited Pplive Corporation 









































Technology Co., Ltd. 
FlipChip 
International, LLC 
and its Subsidiaries 
002203 2016-04-08 浙江海亮股份
有限公司 















Nanjing Aotecar New 
Energy Technology 
Co., Ltd. 
Aits US Inc., Air 
International Thermal 
(Luxembourg) S.à 






Optech Co., Ltd. 
Optorun Co., Ltd. 
002280 2015-05-09 数字天域(香港)
科技有限公司 







Investment Co., Ltd. 
WPR Holdings LLC, 
Wellman Plastics 







FION Co., Ltd. 
002354 2015-10-28 大连科冕木业
股份有限公司 
Dalian Kemian Wood 














Blue Sail Medical Co., 
Ltd. 





























ZYNP Corporation Incodel Holding LLC 











Textile Co., Ltd. 




Milk New Zealand 
(Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 




















Precision Science & 
Technology Co., Ltd. 





technology Co., Ltd. 
Supernova Holdings 




Technology Co., Ltd. 







Qinghai Huzhu Barley 
Wine Co., Ltd. 














































Aier Eye International, 
Sl. 
Clinica Baviera, S.A. 
300017 2017-06-24 网宿科技股份
有限公司 
Wangsu Science & 































Optics Co., Ltd. 






of Oriental Nations 
Corporation Ltd. 















Anhui Anli Material 
Technology Co., Ltd. 











Investment Co., Ltd. 








































Beijing Kunlun Tech. 
Co., Ltd., Qihoo 360 
Software (Beijing) Co., 

















Zhejiang Jinke Culture 
Industry Co., Ltd. 













Technology Co., Ltd. 



















(Hong Kong) Ltd. 





Deep Sea Fisheries 
Co., Ltd. 























































































Industrial Co., Ltd. 





SDIC Power Holdings 
Co., Ltd. 
Repsol Nuevas 






Group Co., Ltd. 























Joint Stock Co., Ltd. 
Noblelift Holding 
Singapore Pte. Ltd. 
603766 2017-01-21 隆鑫通用动力
股份有限公司 
Loncin Motor Co., Ltd. C.M.D Costruzioni 











Stock_code EquityNatureID MajorRestructuringSign RelevanceSign 
 
 68 
000065 1 0 0 
000333 0 0 0 
000553 1 1 1 
000639 0 1 0 
000681 0 0 1 
000718 0 0 0 
000811 1 1 1 
000901 1 1 1 
000923 1 1 1 
000930 1 1 1 
002019 0 0 0 
002024 0 0 1 
002044 0 0 0 
002079 0 0 0 
002086 0 0 0 
002151 0 0 0 
002153 0 0 0 
002180 0 1 0 
002185 0 0 0 
002203 0 0 0 
002228 0 0 1 
002239 0 1 0 
002273 0 0 0 
002280 0 0 0 
002324 0 1 0 
002345 0 0 0 
002354 0 1 1 
002381 0 0 0 
002382 0 1 1 
002383 0 0 0 
002384 0 0 0 
002399 0 0 0 
002448 0 0 0 
002464 0 1 0 
002466 0 0 0 
002486 0 0 0 
002505 0 0 1 
002520 0 1 0 
002554 0 0 0 
002611 0 0 0 
002635 0 1 0 
002637 0 0 0 
002646 0 0 0 
002658 0 0 0 
002675 0 0 0 
002698 0 0 0 
 
 69 
002701 0 0 0 
002727 0 0 0 
002833 0 0 0 
300015 0 0 0 
300017 0 1 0 
300043 0 1 1 
300056 0 0 0 
300058 0 0 0 
300061 0 0 0 
300166 0 0 0 
300175 0 0 0 
300209 0 1 0 
300218 0 0 0 
300252 0 0 0 
300262 0 0 0 
300278 0 1 0 
300363 0 0 0 
300387 0 0 0 
300388 0 0 0 
300418 0 0 0 
300419 0 0 0 
300459 0 0 0 
300464 0 0 0 
300466 0 0 0 
300512 0 0 0 
300545 0 0 0 
600073 1 1 0 
600097 1 1 0 
600146 0 0 0 
600196 0 0 0 
600258 1 1 1 
600270 1 0 1 
600337 0 0 0 
600469 1 0 1 
600558 1 0 1 
600570 0 0 0 
600682 0 1 0 
600754 1 1 0 
600759 0 1 0 
600777 0 0 0 
600886 1 0 0 
601717 1 1 0 
601727 1 0 0 
603085 0 0 1 
603222 0 0 0 
603611 0 0 0 
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603766 0 0 0 
603808 0 0 1 
 
 
Stock_code ExpenseValue  log(ExpenseValue) Hierarchy_en 
000065 250359595.2  8.398564241 State-owned Enterprise 
000333 3089361000  9.48986866  
000553 18471006998  10.26649057 State-owned Enterprise 
000639 4875378000  9.688008293  
000681 525395000  8.720485935  












000930 8284728000  9.918278254 Central Enterprise 
002019 1000680000  9.00029522  
002024 2587993100  9.412963114  
002044 181763632.4  8.259506993  
002079 5840000  6.766412847  
002086 450000000  8.653212514  
002151 456822000  8.659747011  
002153 81747000  7.912471824  
002180 390919888.6  8.592087766  
002185 249206898.2  8.39656006  
002203 196878000  8.294197189  
002228 718000000  8.856124444  
002239 857170000  8.933066963  
002273 119272797.6  8.076541406  
002280 18586500  7.269197616  
002324 433330000  8.636818757  
002345 177600000  8.249442961  
002354 2070000000  9.315970345  
002381 11272000  7.05200098  
002382 3843089400  9.584680487  
002383 41508708  7.618139216  
002384 308193000  8.48882277  
002399 1368862700  9.13635989  
002448 665804920  8.823347  
002464 2184000000  9.339252634  
002466 1397148990  9.145242721  
002486 170866311.3  8.232656444  
002505 249730200  8.397471065  
002520 108451200  8.035234362  
002554 510443200  8.707947423  
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002611 39508184  7.596687068  
002635 819810000  8.913713212  
002637 530000000  8.72427587  
002646 807.079  2.906916047  
002658 12593900  7.100160241  
002675 315000000  8.498310554  
002698 71191000  7.852425093  
002701 52031700  7.716268016  
002727 12452410  7.095253412  
002833 124000000  8.093421685  
300015 1111454400  9.045891649  
300017 1281972700  9.107878777  
300043 51835400  7.714626454  
300056 813400  5.910304168  
300058 1094060000  9.03904114  
300061 71247711.13  7.852770917  
300166 170140000  8.230806428  
300175 0  0  
300209 149210000  8.17379793  
300218 13644018.6  7.134942303  
300252 110600000  8.043755127  
300262 59066400  7.771340502  
300278 329158800  8.51740547  
300363 180692200  8.256939406  
300387 120000000  8.079181246  
300388 34729000  7.540692278  
300418 7814160000  9.892882299  
300419 27000000  7.431363764  
300459 643915812.5  8.80882909  
300464 22013880  7.342696595  
300466 26467624.97  7.422714972  
300512 8285714.29  6.918329954  











600146 1880000000  9.274157849  






600270 4967500  6.696137876 State-owned Enterprise 
600337 31897344  7.503754522  






600570 367200000  8.564902673  
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600759 2139445000  9.330301126  
600777 200000000  8.301029996  











603085 480000000  8.681241237  
603222 36620220  7.563720949  
603611 6.7451  0.828988393  
603766 180927450  8.257504462  
603808 154000000  8.187520721  
 
